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Knowing ‘Wh’ and Knowing How:  
Constructing Professional Curricula and Integrating Epistemic Fields. 
 
I. Introduction: 
 
This paper is concerned with the interpretation of professional curricula and 
qualifications in the light of  the debate between ‘intellectualists’ and ‘anti-
intellectualists’ concerning whether or not know-how is a species of propositional 
knowledge (e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001). It argues that a central claim of 
intellectualists, that ‘knowing wh’ constructions are to be construed as only 
expressive of propositional knowledge is false. As professional educational examples 
make clear, not only are such constructions pervasive in curriculum and assessment 
documents but they often refer to cases of know-how. In fact, both the ‘know that’ 
and ‘know how’ interpretations of knowing wh are closely connected in professional 
education and this is essential for our ability to place our trust in such qualifications. 
This will be shown through examples. Neither intellectualists nor anti-intellectualists 
can give us an adequate picture of how such constructions work, let alone the work 
that they do in professional education. Not only should this should prompt a rethink in 
mainstream epistemological debate about the role of  Knowing Wh, but it should also 
make curriculum designers and assessors more aware of potential ambiguity in their 
documentation.1 
 
Much debate on the nature of knowing how (KH) has concerned the status of ‘knowing wh’  to 
support the claim that KH is a form of propositional knowledge (KT), since knowledge expressed 
in ‘knowing wh’ constructions is propositional knowledge and a proper understanding of KH itself 
involves understanding it as a form of  knowledge expressed through ‘knowing wh’ constructions.   
 
This paper will look at the implications of a clear view of Knowing Wh for 
professional and vocational education. Knowing Wh is a category of interest not only 
to philosophers but also to educators. I will argue that the treatment of Knowing Wh 
by educators and professionals has significant implications for philosophical 
treatments of Knowing Wh. In turn, philosophical debates on the nature of Knowing 
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Wh have a bearing on our understanding of the way in which KH is conceptualised in 
professional curricula. 
 
Educators of professionals want to know whether or not someone knows how to 
operate in a professional field of activity, and with how well they know how to. They 
also want to have a clear view of the elements of professional knowledge and how 
they relate to each other. They are often thought of as more than a bundle of skills but 
as a wide-ranging competence (Hanf 2007). Generating answers to such questions 
helps us to understand the relationship between different modes of knowing: 
propositional knowledge (KT) and KH.2 These modes of knowing are distinct but 
closely related epistemic abilities and in assessing professional capacity we often find 
them together as part of an overall professional competence. When we examine 
professional competence, we are obliged to make distinctions which suggest that there 
are closely related epistemic powers exercised as part of that competence. But, as we 
shall also see, the tripartite epistemic classification outlined above needs some 
modification, particularly when we consider judgement.  
 
Linguistic ambiguity, particularly in English, compounds the difficulties and has 
implications for the design of professional curricula and qualifications. One can see 
this in the case of curricula that do not make explicit reference to the theoretical and 
practical aspects of content. For example, in the BTEC National in Construction  it is 
stated that the candidate must be able to apply ‘knowledge and understanding to the 
range of content’ without stating whether this involves action or giving an account of 
what the candidate would do (BTEC 2003, p.31).  Rumfitt (2003) drew attention to 
the ambiguity in the English construction ‘to know how…’ and its cognates and the 
fact that it can mean ‘to be able to do F’ and ‘to be able to give an account of how to 
F’. However, there is a much wider range of ways of expressing epistemic attributions 
that further complicate discussion. Since these constructions commonly occur in 
professional curricula and assessment instruments it is important to interpret them 
properly. In much of the literature, KT is said to be very often expressed in 
‘Knowledge Wh’ constructions and some commentators assume that such 
constructions invariably refer to KT, including constructions which involve ‘knows 
wh’(Schaffer op.cit., Stanley and Williamson op.cit., Farkas (2016). Knowledge Wh 
(KWh) constructions include: 
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1) A knows when to F. 
 
2) A knows where x is located. 
 
3) A knows whether B is lying. 
 
4) A knows why the ship sank. 
 
5) A knows who defrauded the bank. 
 
6) A knows how to tie a reef knot. 
 
7) A knows what is best for B to eat. 
 
Such constructions do indeed often express propositional knowledge. However, 
matters are more complex and professional educators need to take account of this. 
This is particularly clear for those professional qualifications that assume competent 
practice as an assessment criterion. We will see several examples of this in the 
concluding section. 
 
KWh constructions. 
 
One important feature of KWh constructions has been little observed. They are 
sometimes capable of taking what Ryle (1949) called ‘intelligence epithets’ or 
evaluative adverbs or adverbial phrases. They are important in professional 
assessment when one wishes to grade performance or knowledge., as in the case of 
the BTEC Construction curriculum referred to earlier. Thus one can say: 
 
8) A knows more or less when to sound the alarm. 
 
9) A knows exactly where the treasure is buried. 
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One of Ryle’s central claims was that intelligence epithets apply only to KH 
constructions. But if KWh constructions express KT and they also take intelligence 
epithets, then Ryle’s distinction in philosophical grammar between KH and KT 
constructions may no longer hold. I will explain and defend three theses bearing 
directly on the way in which we handle KWh constructions in professional education.  
 
Thesis 1: KWh claims are often ambiguous between KH (and related forms) and KT. 
Such ambiguities in KWh claims can be disambiguated through context, 
exemplification or explanation.  
 
Thesis 2: Some forms of knowing wh can be understood in both KT and KH senses 
and also in a Knowing To sense, closely related to but not identical with KH. 
Disambiguation depends critically on which aspect of a professional capacity one is 
looking at. 
 
Thesis 3: Both KT, KH (and related) forms of KWh) have to be taught and assessed in 
an integrated manner in professional contexts. 
 
Thesis 1:  
 
First I present an outline of the case made by propositional intellectualists such as 
Stanley and Williamson, that KWh constructions express propositional knowledge. 
 
1] A claim to propositional knowledge can be put in the form of an embedded 
question. ‘W is the way to ensure effective building insulation’ is the answer to a 
question of the form ‘What is the way to effectively insulate a building?’ Thus a 
‘knows what’ claim is a claim to have propositional knowledge. One objection is that 
to show that one knows the answer to an embedded question is to demonstrate an 
ability (to answer the question) and thus a form of KH. However, if KH is really KT 
in a practical mode of presentation then this objection can be dismissed, since it is 
unreasonable to expect the answer to a question always to be offered in the form of an 
assertion. Norman Malcolm (1977, esp.pp.224-225) pointed out that the question 
‘Where did Daddy leave the shovel?’ could be answered by son Jerry running to the 
dogwood tree and picking it up.3  Knowledge of the answer can be expressed 
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practically and a third person report that Jerry knew where Daddy had left the shovel 
would normally be correct. However, the coherence of the idea of a practical mode of 
presentation of propositional knowledge needs more scrutiny.  
 
2] KWh, like KH claims, can be asserted as responses to an embedded question. Both 
can also be expressed in a practical mode of presentation.  
 
3]  So there is good reason to think that KH is a subspecies of KWh, since KWh 
claims are also responses to embedded questions as in Malcolm’s example, and KH 
claims can be rendered as responses to embedded questions as in the Ship Inn 
example. Jerry’s action is an answer to the embedded question ‘Where did Daddy 
leave the shovel?’ and expresses the proposition that Daddy left the shovel leaning 
against the dogwood tree, just as using correct procedures in insulating a building  
expresses the claim that A knows that w is the way to effectively insulate a building. 
 
4] So it looks as if any attempt to show that KH is not a form of KT would also show 
that other KWh cases are also not examples of KT. But we are happy to treat these 
kinds of examples as KT. 
 
5] Since it is clear that KWh cases are cases of KT it cannot be the case that KH is not 
KT, since KH constructions are themselves a form of KWh construction, answers to 
embedded questions. 
 
The general form of the argument is that KH claims are a form of KWh claim, and 
since KWh claims are a form of KT claim, then they too are a form of KT claim (see 
Farkas op.cit. pp.109-110). 
 
Response. 
The argument assumes that because some forms of KWh can be rendered as answers 
to embedded questions and thus as examples of KT, all can.4 While it is true to say 
that Jerry knows how to effectively insulate a building, we assume that he would be 
able to assert this if asked.5However, it does not follow that if Tom knows that w is a 
way to install a light socket, then he should be able to assert what this way is, if asked. 
If Tom knows (in a practical mode of presentation) that w is a way to install a light 
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socket , then although we can say with confidence that he knows how to do so  (if he 
can do so repeatedly and in varied circumstances, see Hornsby 2011), we would 
hesitate to say that he knows that w is a way to install a light socket  if he is unable to 
give a satisfactory account of how to do so in a context where such a response is 
expected, for example in a formal assessment of competence.6 There are many cases 
for knowledge that claims where we expect an account or an assertion plus 
justification by A to be confident that A knows that p.7 Why?  
 
One reason is that propositional knowledge does not usually come in proposition-
sized chunks but is connected with other knowledge making single propositions 
intelligible within a topic or organised subject. If someone is unable to make these 
connections, then we may doubt whether they actually know what they claim to 
know, as opposed to being able merely to assert it. This is connected with the familiar 
idea that knowledge requires justification. If I claim to know that p, I should be able, 
if asked in a professional context, to justify my claim.8 So, although we should accept 
that KT can often be expressed practically, we should be more wary of the claim that 
actions expressive of KT always constitute a fully fledged knowledge claim and that 
we are always entitled to attribute knowledge that on such a basis.9 
 
The second point is that KWh attributions are not always unambiguous with respect to their 
propositionality (Bengson and Moffett 2007, 2011b). English uses the various KWh as well as KH 
constructions in different ways which are usually disambiguated through context or questioning.  
Thus Tom knows how to ride install a light socket can mean both that he is able to do 
so and that he can give an account of how to do so. In German this is marked by the 
können/wissen distinction and in French by the savoir comment faire/savoir faire 
distinction (Rumfitt op.cit.). These distinctions apply to KWh constructions. 
 
To take an example which can easily be extended across other KWh cases: 
 
10] A (a heavy goods vehicle driver) knows when to apply the brakes 
 
Can mean: 
 
11] There is a time t and A knows that the brakes should be applied at t.10 
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or  
12] A knows how to apply the brakes at an appropriate time. 
or  
13] A knows to apply the brakes at an appropriate time.11 
 
11] normally implies that there is some time t, and A knows what it is. Thus if A 
knows what that time is, he also knows that the brakes should be applied at that time, 
without implying that he can apply the brakes at that time. It can also mean that A can 
recognise that time when it occurs, because it is expressed by a description and A can 
recognise that time when it falls under that description. In this case there is a t which 
A knows, which falls under a description eg. ‘when the road becomes slippery’ rather 
than being a direct temporal designation. Again, this does not imply that A is able to 
apply the brakes at that time. 12] suggests that whatever the appropriate time is, A can 
apply the brakes at that time even if s/he cannot assert that t is the time. The element 
of generality is important, as KH attributions if they are correct, need to apply to 
multiple instances with varying circumstances, not just once. 
 
How do we know whether 10] should be understood as 11], 12] or 13]? The context is 
important. In an examination, the appropriate answer is usually 11]. In a practical test, 
the answer is usually 12] in a post facto assessment or enquiry, 13] might be most 
appropriate. In everyday practice, we rarely have difficult in making the appropriate 
judgement. In the context of teaching and assessment however, it is important that 
there be no ambiguity about which sense is meant and further explanation may be 
necessary, for example in curriculum or assessment documents. As we shall see, this 
is often not the case. We can say, therefore, that some KWh is clearly KT and some is 
KH or closely related to it. 
 
However, Stanley and Williamson would say that both are cases of KT. What appears 
to be KH is really KT in a practical mode of presentation in the latter case.  Thus in 
the first case (11]) there is a t which A knows, which could be elicited from A. In the 
second case (12]), A can simply apply the brakes appropriately and the 3rd person 
attribution, ‘A knows that t is the time to apply the brakes’ is correct. But this does 
not entail that A knows how to apply the brakes at a particular time that he can 
articulate, either through specifying a time or describing when it would be 
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appropriate. So it looks as if in this case A knows how to apply the brakes at the 
appropriate time, but cannot assert that t (or a description thereof) is the appropriate 
time. The ‘practical mode of presentation’ of  
 
A knows when to apply the brakes 
 
is therefore not equivalent to the corresponding assertions which express what time A 
thinks is appropriate (with appropriate justification if required). It is not possible to 
infer KT from action which is consistent with the possession of KT but which does 
not possess its characteristic 1st person features.12 In the third case (13]) we may be 
interested in the element of judgement that resulted in A applying the brakes rather 
than his ability to actually apply them. Is there evidence that he made a correct 
judgement to apply the brakes in this instance? 
 
This suggests that KWh constructions should not always be read as KT. In appropriate 
contexts they have a valid KH interpretation.  This is important in cases of 
professional action. This concludes the preliminary case for Thesis 1, that KWh and 
KH constructions can be ambiguous between KT and KH interpretations and can be 
contextually disambiguated. We still need to ask how such disambiguation can take 
place. There is no single answer to this question. Apart from asking someone who 
makes a claim in which sense s/he meant it, it is also possible to judge which claim 
makes most sense in a particular context, where for example acting rather than saying 
would look like a misinterpretation of what was asked for.   
 
Thesis 2: Some forms of Knowing Wh can be understood in both KT and KH (and 
also in a Knowing To sense, closely related to but not identical with KH) senses for 
some forms of professional knowledge, depending on which aspect of a professional 
capacity one is looking at. 
 
Professional ability usually involves the application of systematic KT to KH. This is 
particularly clear in the German Facharbeiter stratum of the economy, if much less so 
in sections of the UK labour market (Hanf 2011, p.55; Brockmann, Clarke and Winch 
2010, p.43).  In order to understand professional know-how fully, we need to 
distinguish between KH as an assessable skill (weak sense), related to a type of task 
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such as installing the wiring in a room according to a diagram, from professional 
know-how as a theoretically informed wide-ranging ability (strong sense), such as 
being able to plan and carry out the rewiring of a building. In this stronger sense 
would be incorporated second order abilities such as planning, controlling, 
communicating, co-ordinating and evaluating, and they are usually combined in a 
recursive third-order ability of project management as in the example above (Winch 
2014). Thus, if a qualified plumber is able to repair a defective house drainage system 
we would expect the ability to manage this as a project based on the ability to plan 
etc.  
 
Professional education has to be able to develop KH in both strong and weak senses. 
Abilities such as planning involve the exercise of skill, but are not completely 
explained by them, since they can be instantiated through different skills in different 
contexts. Neither is the exercise of relevant skills a sufficient condition for the 
exercise of a second-order ability, since if undertaken without sufficient attention or 
seriousness of purpose, the skill will instantiate a ‘seeming to’ act without an actual 
manifestation of the ability in question (Hasselberger 2014, esp.p.153). Not only are 
there multiple ways in which the ability may be exercised, but there can be cases 
where there is no way w available and exercise of the ability in question involves the 
ability to find an appropriate way. In the example above, a plumber may attempt 
various diagnostic techniques which do not identify the defects. In these 
circumstances s/he will have to devise a way of identifying the defects. Here 
theoretical knowledge of the principles underlying plumbing and drainage systems 
will be critically important.13  
 
Both first and second order know-how often involve the application of systematic 
propositional knowledge (KT) to action, so that the professional know-how is itself 
partly constituted by a judgemental ability which involves the ability to infer one 
proposition from another. For propositional intellectualists this would involve 
bringing KT in a non-practical mode of presentation to bear on KT in a practical one 
(KH in their sense). This is assessable through carrying out actions of the relevant 
type, but such assessment cannot usually be sufficient, since there are insufficient 
circumstances in which the ability can be exercised to allow for valid assessment. 
This is particularly so with second-order KH where the actions required may differ 
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significantly from context to context, for example a nurse communicating with 
different patients with different needs. It becomes necessary therefore to ask questions 
of a candidate for a professional qualification to ascertain how they would act in 
certain circumstances. In other words, ability to give an appropriate account of action 
in a hypothetical situation would be a necessary condition of ascribing the ability to 
the candidate. We thus need a combination of abilities: the ability to act appropriately 
and the ability to give an account of how one would act appropriately. This gives us 
trust in the professional’s know-how (Kotzee op.cit.).14 
 
Much application of KT to KH  is the application of one form of KWh to another. 
Thus A knows propositionally the circumstances in which to apply the brakes (either 
under a description or referring to the name of a specific place or time) and is able to 
apply them in those circumstances. For example, as part of his/her theoretical 
knowledge as a train driver, A knows that you apply the brakes to reduce speed when 
approaching a bend of radius smaller than x metres. A might also know that this place 
is where the brakes should be applied (particular knowledge relating to a route). If A 
actually knows how to apply the brakes as well, s/he is thus able to apply the brakes in 
appropriate circumstances. It can be expressed as A knows to apply the brakes or, 
alternatively as A knows when to apply the brakes. Either of these constructions will 
do providing we recognise the complexity of the case. It involves the following 
abilities: recognition that the train is faced with a tight curve, forming a judgement in 
relation to a theoretical proposition and a perception, and the physical ability to apply 
the brakes in the relevant situation. Two of these sub-abilities are forms of know 
how15 and the whole statement, A knows when to apply the brakes can correctly be 
characterised as an attribution of KH to A.  Similar points can be made about 
administering a dose, intervening in a discussion, casting a fishing line etc. 
 
To generalise: for many cases of KWh construction, 
 
A knows that t is a time to F is the right reading (theory T may prescribe this). This 
works both for direct reference and description cases. 
 
For other cases, 
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A can F at an appropriate t is the right reading (situational considerations demand it). 
 
And it can also be the case that  
 
A can F at an appropriate t 
 
Because 
 
A knows that t is a time to F and situational considerations, in conjunction with T, 
suggest it. 
 
In such cases, professional education involves learning knowing when, where, how, 
whether to apply T.  
 
Such knowledge can be assessed in both a practical and a theoretical context Thus the 
German standards for schoolteachers indicate the criteria for both the practical ability 
required and for the hypothetical circumstances where we would like to know how a 
teacher would act (KMK 2014 , eg.p.13). We often need to know, not merely that A 
knows when to  make use of relevant educational research in their classroom work, 
but that A has a good understanding of the conditions under which it is appropriate to 
do so , and can also acquaint himself with those conditions. Professional know-how, 
which involves applying both theoretical and specific knowledge to complex and 
changing operational conditions, demands assessment in both practical and 
propositional modes, as well as acquaintance with appropriate circumstances, 
instruments, etc (see also Winch 2016). 
 
Couching assessments in KWh phrasing is important in dialogical terms, as it 
indicates not only that a statement or action is required in response, but also that the 
answers lie within a certain range relevant to the question asked (Schaffer op.cit.; 
Farkas op.cit. Without committing ourselves to the view either that propositional 
knowledge is intrinsically dialogical (Schaffer) or that KWh is sui generis (Farkas) we 
can nevertheless acknowledge that KWh locutions focus the demand for knowledge 
on specific areas and procedures. In cases where a KWh request clearly requires an 
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answer in the form of an action, we understand the general form of the action and the 
context in which it is required.  
 
 Thus Thesis 2 is supported. 
 
Thesis 3: Both KT and KH (and related) forms of KWh have to be taught and 
assessed in an integrated manner in professional contexts. 
 
It follows that professional education has got to articulate the theoretical and practical 
aspects of the relevant occupation, as well as particular propositional knowledge 
associated with the circumstances in which the occupation is practised. This is a 
challenge because most occupations really do involve at least two different kinds of 
knowledge which have to be integrated. The mode of integration involves explanation 
reinforced by practice. But the power of explanation is an ability and hence a form of 
know-how characterised by: 
 
Ability to give an account of how (generic) F is done which could include: 
 
When it is done 
Why it is done 
In what manner it should be done 
To whom it should be done 
Where it is done 
Whether it should be done 
 
This indicates that an observer can evaluate how well A knows how to F. Hence the 
explanatory ability of A has the characteristics of KH, both in explaining when, why, 
and whether F should be done and in giving a good account of how to F, while at the 
same time demonstrating knowledge of many propositions. These in turn are 
integrated through a network of conceptual and empirical connections which A must 
have mastered in order to achieve expertise, both in the theory underlying the practice 
and in being able to justify and explain actions and decisions taken in professional 
contexts. A’s explanatory ability involved in showing how mastery of a body of 
systematic knowledge is relevant to professional scenarios, is itself a form of KH. 
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We should note, however, that it is possible to attribute KT in a formal sense to 
someone who is able to perform an action which involves a way of performing that 
action. Thus, if John is able to ride a bicycle, we can say that John knows that w is a 
way to ride a bicycle. In itself, there is nothing wrong with this locution. But there is 
plenty wrong with it if we conclude from the observation that A knows that w is a 
way to ride a bicycle, that A is able to assert in appropriate circumstances that w is a 
way to ride a bicycle. In many professional contexts to say that someone has 
propositional knowledge is, minimally, to attribute to them the disposition to assert 
and justify the relevant proposition on appropriate occasions. In this instance 
possession of one ability is not a condition of the other and vice versa, suggesting that 
we are not here dealing with identical items of knowledge expressed in different 
modes of presentation. The two are distinct abilities which need to be integrated in 
professional contexts. 
 
It follows that our knowledge of someone’s professional capacities depends on our 
being able to ascertain and evaluate actions that they take, both practical and more 
theoretical, like explaining and justifying how or why one would act in a certain way 
in certain circumstances. Where only third person attributions using the ‘knows that’ 
locution are possible, then we cannot confidently attribute KT.16 We should therefore 
refrain from attributing KT in professional contexts to someone who can practically 
demonstrate a way of doing something unless they can also  give an account of how 
and why. We want to satisfy ourselves that they understand what they are doing and 
why. The point can be made even more strongly for attempts to assess how well 
someone can perform, which often involves the use of Rylean intelligence epithets (eg 
BTEC 2008, pp. 41-42). 
 
Neither should we assume that being able to give an account of how something is 
done necessarily gives us grounds for assuming that someone has the appropriate 
underpinning knowledge for practising an occupation. It is likely that a body of 
systematic knowledge will provide the underlying rationale for professional action. 
Such knowledge may derive from disciplines such as mathematics, chemistry or 
psychology and will need to be interpreted in the light of particular professional 
circumstances. Furthermore, knowledge of particular circumstances and processes 
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may be required in order to act appropriately. Translating this systematic and non-
systematic knowledge for assessment purposes into attributes necessary for 
professional action will include Knowledge Wh statements such as the agent knows 
whether or not to act in a certain way, why it is necessary or appropriate to do so, 
when and where it is necessary or appropriate to do so, which can be tested practically 
through eliciting actions from the candidate.  
 
Given that we will very often also wish to know how the candidate will act in 
hypothetical circumstances, it will be necessary to elicit a first person account of 
whether, why, when, where and how they would act in such circumstances. These can 
also be subject to evaluation for the quality of the KH demonstrated. Thus, it is 
possible to say that A knows where to apply the instrument correctly through a 
demonstration of actually doing so. The propositional analogue would be where A 
asserts that p is a place where the instrument should be applied. He is said to know 
this if he can answer a question correctly (an ability). In this case we do not say that 
*A knows correctly that p is a place to apply the instrument,17 although we can 
perfectly well say that A knows how to apply the instrument correctly at p.   Ryle’s 
point, that intelligence epithets are applicable to KH constructions but not to KT ones 
holds in the case of KWh once disambiguation has been effected. In such a case, we 
have no other way of knowing whether A knows how to apply the instrument 
correctly, than by gauging whether he knows where to apply the instrument in 
hypothetical circumstances C. But we can only make this inference securely, if we are 
already satisfied that he knows how to apply the instrument in other circumstances, 
that he has sufficient confidence, hand-eye co-ordination, manual dexterity etc. 
When the KT interpretation involves systematic knowledge a description is usually 
appropriate. Thus A knows when to apply the brakes is interpreted as A knows that the 
brakes should be applied in circumstances C (which, for a locomotive driver can 
include track radius, speed, weight of the train etc.).  Assuming a theoretical element 
to driver professional training programmes, A’s systematic knowledge relating to 
physics and track geometry is relevant. This can be contrasted with an interpretation 
referring directly to a place or unit of time, as in A knows that the brakes should be 
applied when travelling at speed ≥ S at the Keystone Corridor, an item of specific 
route knowledge. A, the driver, whose train is travelling at ≥ S at the Keystone 
Corridor, is able to apply the brakes (KH) because general considerations of physics 
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and track geometry indicate that this is appropriate knowing that his train is 
approaching the Keystone Corridor.  
 
One could say, along with Stanley and Williamson, that A knows that w is a way of 
applying the brakes in these circumstances in a practical mode of presentation, but 
this reading of A’s professional knowledge looks forced. First, using the way w 
locution is inappropriate, since the critical part of A’s professional knowledge is not 
the way in which the brakes are applied, but the ability to make the right judgement. 
One can also say that the driver knows to apply the brakes on the curve (Wiggins 
2012). This in turn means that the driver can make the correct judgement that the 
brakes should applied here and that he knows how to apply them correctly. It is 
misleading to say that the driver knows how to apply the brakes here since it is not 
just a matter of physical know-how rather than judgement. Without 1st person 
testimony, it would be misleading to say that he knew that this was the place to apply 
the brakes except in the limited sense of attributed 3rd person knowledge. It is less 
problematic to say that he was able to make the right judgement in these 
circumstances. If need be this ability can be explained by A’s knowledge that relating 
to time, place and theoretical considerations, not by his knowledge of how to apply 
the brakes, which would be taken as presupposed.  
 
In this case as in so many others relating to professional action we are dealing with 
judgement as much as with physical capacity, the ability to make appropriate 
judgements involving the connection of general with particular knowledge and 
recognition of appropriate circumstances. Judgement, itself a developed ability, 
integrates KT (general and specific) and acquaintance knowledge (KA) (recognition 
that these are the appropriate circumstances requiring the judgement and subsequent 
action) and action (itself requiring know how). 
 
This example is relatively simple but illustrates that the epistemic capacities required 
are closely related and need to be taught in an integrated way to ensure that A drives 
safely and efficiently. The point applies a fortiori to more complex forms of 
professional judgement. Thus Thesis 3, that both KT and KH (and related) forms of 
KWh have to be taught and assessed in an integrated manner in professional contexts 
is supported. We have also noted the inadequacy of conceptualising all KH solely in 
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terms of ways and have shown that the practical mode of presentation of an item that 
can be described tendentiously as a form of 3rd person KT can actually be more 
complex than the intellectualist account allows for. 
 
Conclusion. 
 
The final task will be to draw out the implications of this analysis of KWh 
constructions for professional curricula, pedagogy and assessment. Thesis 1 (T1) 
establishes the KT/KH ambiguity of many KWh constructions. Thesis 2 (T2) 
establishes that in professional contexts KWh constructions can be ambiguous and 
often susceptible of KT and KH interpretations which are related to each other. Thesis 
3 (T3) indicates that in educational terms the KT and KH elements embodied in KWh 
requirements need to be taught and assessed in an integrated way.  
 
What are the implications for professional curricula? Both T1 and T2 alert us to the 
the need for both differentiation of KT and KH elements in curricula and for their 
integration to develop appropriate forms of professional judgement and action (T3).18 
This does not simply mean a division between knowledge and skill as is often found 
in such curriculum schemata, but a broader division between knowledge that (which 
includes systematic as well as particular knowledge) and various forms of know-how, 
including transversal and project management abilities which cannot be easily 
accommodated as forms of technique. Crucially, it also involves the development of a 
capacity for judgement closely linked to action. T3 shows that the different epistemic 
modes need to be carefully related to each other to promote professional action and 
judgement and their relationships made clear within curriculum documents. It is 
probably necessary to show clearly, perhaps in tabular form, how certain higher level 
specifications of professional capacity should be manifested in both practical and 
theoretical modes, as with the German competence specifications for teachers. 
 
T3 has clear implications for pedagogy, and suggests that professional judgement has 
to be developed through carefully integrated and interwoven sequences of instruction, 
simulated practice, practice in operational conditions and post hoc reflection. 
Assessment instruments, vital for licensing of professional practice, will need to 
reflect its complexity and take account of the varieties of circumstances in which 
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professional action and judgement will be required, including those that cannot be 
directly assessed. For these cases a ‘thin’ 3rd person manifestation of KT will not be 
appropriate as assessors will want to know how agents think that they should act in 
certain hypothetical circumstances and for this their own words are necessary. 
 
Consideration of the ambiguity of KWh constructions within the broader epistemic 
framework constituting the field of professional judgement and action, leads to the 
view that the framework of professional curricula, which has consequences for 
pedagogy and assessment, necessitate both differentiation between and integration of 
the different epistemic elements. A tabular organisation can go some way towards 
doing this, particularly for differentiation, but the integration of complementary 
elements poses a challenge for perspicuous curriculum design for occupations of 
complexity. 
 
These points can be illustrated by looking at some contemporary professional 
qualifications in the UK. Associated assessment criteria will refer to items of 
propositional knowledge, acquaintance, know-how or understanding which jointly 
will enable an assessor to determine whether an assessment criterion has been met. As 
the literature on KWh suggests (e.g. Schaffer op.cit.), one may expect Knowledge Wh 
statements or questions to occur within a context of presupposition, such as is 
provided by the specific content of the qualification in a particular area or in 
assessment criteria. 
 
One should expect qualification documents to be sensitive to the broad 
epistemological distinctions between propositional, practical and acquaintance 
knowledge. However, some finer grained distinctions are not always observed. This 
poses a potential problem for the understanding and interpretation of such documents 
particularly when, as in the examples below they rely on statements of learning 
outcomes rather than specifications of curriculum content. I will illustrate some of 
these, show where they are addressed in assessment criteria and where they need to be 
addressed in assessment instruments. I will bring out the practical implications of 
Thesis 2 which leads on to the implications of Thesis 3 for qualification design and 
assessment. In doing so, we shall see that Thesis 1 concerning the ambiguity of 
KH/KT attributions is not always dealt with in these documents. 
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How is the KH/KT distinction dealt with in Learning Outcomes (LOs) and 
Assessment Criteria (ACs)?  Although the distinction is not usually made explicitly, it 
reveals itself in the assessment criteria related to the LO. Thus for example in the 
C&G Extended Diploma in Agriculture Unit 3 ‘Understanding the Principles of Plant 
Science’ LO2 states that the candidate should be able to understand the functions of 
plant structures and be able to explain the function of the major plant structures 
(AC2) (C&G 2012a).This would clearly count as a case of KT, but note: first, 
explanation does not involve the assertion of a series of propositions, but the coherent 
ordering of related propositions to demonstrate some element of plant biology. The 
candidate demonstrates knowledge of plant structures through the ability to explain 
their functions. Second, the explanation has to be given in the first person: it is not 
enough to demonstrate knowledge of the function of plant structures through activities 
which demonstrate that knowledge.19  
 
How is KH dealt with in learning outcomes and assessment criteria? KH formulations 
are sometimes actually KT items, where knowing how to F means being able to give 
an account of how to F. Thus the CG level 3 Diploma in Waste Management has as 
LO: The learner will: know how to monitor procedures to safely control work 
operations (C&G 2012b). The assessment criteria all involve explanation and 
description, rather than monitoring activities per se (p.42). On the other hand there are 
cases where it is obvious that a KH learning outcome involves performance of the 
relevant actions. Thus, in the Extended Diploma in Agriculture, LO1 of Undertake 
Agricultural Crop Production, namely Know how to establish crops involves, as well 
as explanation and identification, the ability to Select appropriate equipment for 
seedbed preparations. There is a close relationship between these two kinds of KH 
assessment criteria and there is a good reason for this when assessing someone’s 
ability to act successfully in an occupation. In this example the assessment criteria 
imply that the candidate knows what equipment to select and s/he does this in a 
practical sense, i.e. by actually selecting the correct equipment. Thus, Thesis 1 that 
KT/KH ambiguity is resolvable by context is supported, although this is far from ideal 
in a qualification document. 
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Specification of KWh instances which are KH examples are quite easy to find in 
qualification documents. Thus in the C&G Level 2 Diploma in Health and Social Care 
the candidate is expected to: be able to work in partnership with others and this in 
turn  involves the ability to demonstrate how and when to access support and advice 
over various matters (C&G 2015a, p.49). This is a case of knowing how and when in 
a practical sense through professional action. In the C&G CNC Manufacturing 
Engineering Qualification at Level 3, we find that the candidate should be able to seek 
out additional information where there are gaps and deficiencies in the information 
available (C&G 2011, p.24). On the one hand, it can mean that the candidate knows 
how to find such information, on the other it implies that the candidate knows where 
to look for it in a practical sense, either in general terms or in terms of a specific 
location. Incidentally, this implies that the candidate does not know where the 
additional information is unless they are actually able to seek it out in the 
‘achievement’ sense (see Farkas op.cit. Section 3).  
 
A final example comes from the C&G Level 2 qualification for Dental Nurses. A 
candidate should be able to: process and store dental records, charts and images in a 
way that protects their confidentiality (C&G 2015b, p.52). The candidate has to know 
what to store and where in workplace conditions, manifesting those abilities 
practically. Arguably this ought to be supplemented by some explanation of why. 
 
Know-how attributions concern action types, albeit with token variations. It is thus 
impossible to assess someone’s complex ability only through observation of action in 
limited circumstances. The candidate needs to also explain or describe how they 
would act in a range of circumstances before a safe inference can be made to 
possession of the relevant know-how. Thus in the Diploma in Agriculture we find that 
the candidate should identify the factors which limit the rate of photosynthesis. (p.47). 
This example of knowing which could be assessed through practical agricultural 
activity such as selection of planting locations, but this would not provide the assessor 
with sufficient evidence of the ability, which would need to be supplemented by a 
description of those factors and an explanation of why they were factors. In practice, 
professional know how, including its KWh manifestations, requires dual validation in 
both action and description/explanation, bearing out the claims of T2 and T3, that 
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KWh has to be understood in both KT and KH senses and that they should be taught 
and assessed in both.  
 
These points are evident when we consider qualifications from the practical point of 
view, whether they provide a guarantee of the holder’s ability to operate in a complex 
occupation. Philosophically, it is interesting that these examples appear to vindicate a 
position that associates know-how with ability and knowing wh with ability in certain 
contexts and, furthermore, that KT and KH turn out to be essential markers of 
occupational competence and that both are necessary in order to ascribe competence.  
 
According to Stanley and Williamson it can be sufficient to attribute KT to someone 
through performance of an appropriate action. We can now see that this won’t do.  
First, because a single action would be insufficient to attribute know-how in a 
professional context, however know-how is interpreted. Second, because it is often 
necessary to seek counterfactual evidence before we can reliably attribute either KH 
or KT. If candidates are unable to provide an account of why they act and how they 
would act in hypothetical circumstances, then evidence for their knowledge is 
inadequate.  
 
This is reflected in qualifications. A candidate for the C&G Diploma in Waste 
Management has to describe appropriately the on-site procedures for the 
management, movement and storage of waste (p,39). Carrying out these procedures is 
not sufficient for the attribution of the appropriate KT to the candidate, although 
necessary for the attribution of the appropriate KH. The assessor needs a 
comprehensive picture of the candidate’s knowledge, more than could be provided by 
the performance of a few actions.20 The assessor will also want to probe why the 
candidate believes that waste should be handled in a certain manner rather than in 
another, or will expect a justification for these assertions. It is thus misleading, in 
many professional contexts to attribute KT via the third person route; the ability of the 
candidate to describe and explain in the first person sense is indispensable to reliable 
attributions of propositional knowledge and thus to ensuring that candidates 
understands what they are doing, that is, they know how to act in a variety of complex 
professional situations.  In turn, confidence in the candidate’s understanding is vital to 
the probity of professional curricula and assessment methods. 
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Professional qualifications are a guarantee to society and employers that the person 
holding the qualification can do what the qualifications says they can do. This is why 
they are trusted. The stakes are often very high, since an untrustworthy or poorly 
assessed qualification may put life and limb at peril. The mix of different kinds of 
knowledge and the way that they are related should actually meet the requirements of 
a guarantee. The probity of qualifications is tested on an everyday basis. If they pass 
this test, this gives us some reason to conclude that the underlying epistemological 
assumptions of the qualification are well-founded. Without an appreciation of the 
need for genuine (1st person) KT, an integration of KT with KH and an 
acknowledgement that guidance is needed in interpreting KWh constructions in 
context, we fail to gain a clear perspective on the design and evaluation of curriculum 
documents. Neither intellectualism nor anti-intellectualism can provide us with this 
clear perspective. 
 
Finally, the ambiguous nature of KWh constructions undercuts the intellectualist 
claim that KH is a form of KWh, since it can be shown that KWh constructions can 
indicate KH. It is no longer possible to construe the KWh answer to an embedded 
question reading of knowledge claims as a clear case of KT without begging the 
question as to what the answer must be. Furthermore, it will not do to assign 
equivalence to 3rd and 1st person manifestations of knowledge in professional 
contexts, since the former alone cannot indicate agential understanding of what is 
being done. 
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Notes. 
 
1 See Kotzee (2016) for an account of the role of explanation in attributions of know-how. Contrary to 
Kotzee’s classification, Winch does not see himself in the ‘anti-intellectualist’ camp. See conclusion of 
this article. 
2 Knowledge terminology in English does not map neatly onto these three and context is often needed 
to disambiguate propositions about knowledge. This does not mean that there are no differences 
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between knowing that expressed in KWh constructions and other knowing that claims (See Schaffer 
2007). 
3 See also White (1982),  pp.119-121. 
4 This rendering occurs through grammatical transformation. For example, ‘where B is’ in  ‘A knows where B is’ is an 
answer to the (unasked) question ‘Where is B?’ But a] where is B? is not actually asked; b] the ‘answer’ in ‘where B 
is’ transposes the ‘is’ within the complement and c] a force marker ‘?’ is added to form the question. Some 
commentators suggest that KWh constructions are better seen as attaching a complement to the  knows claim, thus 
‘where B is’ is attached to ‘A knows…’ (see Parent‚ (2014) pp. 87-88 for more on this). 
5 We need to take account of the tacit element in know-how and accept that no account can be 
complete. See Gascoigne and Thornton (2013) for a claim to the articulability of tacit knowledge and 
Winch (2016) for a critique. See Krogh, G, Ichijo, K. and Nonaka, I. for the claim that tacit knowledge 
can be shared. 
6 Kotzee maintains that know how always involves being able to give an account (p.231). The claim 
argument here does not support this claim in the general sense but does do so for a variety of forms of 
professional assessment That Tom can explain how a light socket should be installed increases our 
confidence in his knowing how to do so.. 
7 There could be a lesser form of KT, expressible only in 3rd person terms, but this makes the full 
‘KH/KWh is KT’ claim without qualification, problematic. See more on this in the concluding 
discussion. 
8 There are no claims here about whether justification plus true belief constitutes a sufficient condition 
for knowledge. 
9 Contrast White op.cit. who seems to think that 1st and 3rd person attributions are equally expressive of 
knowledge. For White, possessing knowledge is possessing an ability to answer a question. But this 
kind of ability must be a form of know-how. 
10 Note that t can designate a particular time or can describe a time at which A knows when to 
terminate the group work, for example when following  a rigidly prescribed lesson plan. A may not 
recognise that t is that time and thus fail to terminate the group work.  This does not make sense when t 
designates a specific time, although we should also allow for the possibility that A recognises t and that 
t is a time to terminate the group work, but A does not know how to terminate the group work  at t. 
 
11 As we shall see, we will need a construction like 13] to  take account of cases where Knowing Wh 
involves judgement. This is not necessarily the case with 12], where the response could be automatic. 
See the discussion in Wiggins (2012) pp.107-8 and pp. 113-4. Wiggins’ own example concerns the 
work of librarians know which kind of catalogue to access. 
12 Malcolm’s example shows us that it is legitimate to infer KT from an appropriate action in the right 
circumstances, not that all such cases are equivalent to 1st person manifestations of KT. This point is 
also important for the knowing to cases which involve judgement. 
13 For a contrasting view of what plumbers need to know see Carr  (1981), p.61.  
14 The philosophical literature on know-how and expertise show different views on this issue, ranging 
from Dreyfus’ (1996) characterization of expertise as a form of unconscious fluency, to Lum’s (2013) 
advocacy of expansive assessment, treating all forms of knowledge as aspects of the same 
phenomenon, to the views of Eraut (1994) and Winch (2010) which emphasise the role that systematic 
knowledge plays in professional action. 
15 Not all forms of ability involving recognition are instances of know-how, but this complex is, as it 
involves correct recognition of a curve in the track, intention to drive the train safely, a rationale for 
acting and is subject to evaluation (how prompt, how accurate, how detailed was the recognition?). 
Although we do not normally say A knows how to judge that p, the ability to judge that p in this case 
has the characteristics of know how. 
16 Malcolm’s example seems to contradict this, but Malcolm is not claiming that two of the sons are 
incapable of saying where daddy left the shovel, only that they need not, on this occasion, do so. 
17 We should distinguish this from the case where A knows that p is a place to apply the instrument 
correctly, which would mean where it is appropriate to apply it. Here ‘correctly’ qualifies the place 
rather than the knowledge. 
18 This seems to be less the case than previously in English qualification documents, for example in the 
C&G qualifications reviewed. For a document with more curriculum content, see BTEC 2003). 
19 Surprisingly, both Ryle and Stanley and Williamson seem to think that 3rd person demonstrations of 
knowledge that p are equivalent in probative force to 1st person articulation. This is not generally the 
view of exam boards. 
20 See the critique of Competence Based Training and Education initiated by Hyland (1993). 
